Clearly Established #21
Welcome to the 21st issue of Clearly Established! It’s been a minute since our last issue, and we’re making up for it with a bonanza edition. As well as our usual irreverent roundup of recent accountability decisions, we've got an in-depth review of the state of Bivens around the country. Let’s dive right in.
Bivens—A Deep Dive
What is Bivens? Bivens is how you sue federal agents for violating your constitutional rights. If a local cop violates your constitutional rights—say, your right against excessive force—a statute called 42 U.S.C. § 1983 gives you the right to sue in federal court. This is called a “right of action,” and it’s separate from the substantive right against excessive force. Think of it as the key that opens the courthouse doors. There’s no analogue to § 1983 for federal agents, but in a 1971 case called Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, the Supreme Court said that the Constitution itself gives you the right to sue federal agents for violating your constitutional rights.
What’s happening to Bivens? The Supreme Court drastically limited Bivens in a 2017 case called Ziglar v. Abbasi, holding that when a case presents a “new context,” courts can hear it only if there are no “special factors.” Then, in last year’s Egbert v. Boule, it cut Bivens down to nearly nothing: Nearly any difference from the Court’s existing Bivens cases makes for a new context, it held, and nearly anything can be a special factor. The lower courts have been sorting out just what this means, and many of them have decided it means that Bivens is over.
What does this mean going forward? Well, if you thought qualified immunity was bad, this is worse. In effect, in large swathes of the country, federal officials now enjoy something close to absolute immunity. They can beat you, silence your speech, arrest you without cause, and inflict cruel and unusual punishment on you—and there’s nothing you can do about it.
With that cheery summary out of the way, let’s take a look at what courts of appeals have been doing with Bivens claims since Egbert.
Remember the Trump administration’s family-separation scandal? Well, it turns out some of those families sued! D.C. Circuit: This is obviously a new context with special factors. Judge Silberman, concurring: The Supreme Court should overrule Bivens just like it overruled Roe v. Wade, and while we’re at it I have some thoughts about this whole “free press” thing.
In 2018, Bureau of Prisons officials transferred James “Whitey” Bulger—infamous Boston gangster and FBI informant—from protective segregation to general population. Within 14 hours, he had been murdered for being a snitch. Sounds awfully similar to at least two Supreme Court Bivens cases, so full steam ahead, right? Not according to the Fourth Circuit, which used some trivial differences to find a new context, conjured up some special factors that would apply in nearly every case, and dismissed the claim. A huge blow to Bivens there.
In a bit of a surprise, the Seventh Circuit held that Egbert “does not change ... Bivens’ continued force in its domestic Fourth Amendment context.” For once, we have nothing snarky to say!
A federal agent shoots a woman for a traffic offense; she brings an excessive-force claim under Bivens. Bivens itself was an excessive-force case, so there’s no way this is a new context, right? Ninth Circuit: Wrong. Bivens took place indoors, while this case took place outdoors. So that’s a new context. And the agency here has a complaint form on the internet, so that’s a special factor. Case dismissed. Note: Public Accountability represented the woman in a petition for rehearing en banc. We got the court to delete some of the worst bits of its opinion, but mostly it stuck to its guns.
A prison guard enters a prisoner’s cell, out of view of the hallway cameras, and beats him up. A cut-and-dry violation of the Eighth Amendment. But the Tenth Circuit begins its decision by intoning: “Today, we are called upon to expand the judicially implied cause of action described in Bivens ....” You can see where this is going. Case dismissed.
Believe it or not, though, a sliver of hope remains. As we were going to print, the Fourth Circuit held that a specific subset of Eighth Amendment claims—claims for failure to treat a medical condition—may yet survive Egbert. And Public Accountability is preparing a similar appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Federal agents don’t have complete absolute immunity just yet, and we’re going to fight tooth and nail for every last scrap of accountability.
The Roundup
And now, back to our regular programming—
In Supreme Court news, Justice Clarence Thomas has called for overruling the Feres doctrine, a special rule of immunity for the government when the plaintiff is a member of the military. (For example: After a female cadet at West Point was raped by a fellow cadet, she filed suit against superior officers who put her in harm’s way. The Second Circuit held that her claim was barred by Feres.) Here at PA, we always give credit where it’s due, and Justice Thomas is exactly right: Congress said you can sue the government for compensation if you’re injured by its negligence, and Congress didn’t stutter. Feres should be overruled.
When the cops set up at an intersection to catch drivers breaking the law, can you warn oncoming cars by holding up an “Cops Ahead” sign? You sure can, says the Second Circuit, and that’s clearly established to boot. No qualified immunity for the cop who arrested the sign-holder.
Prison guards bully a Muslim inmate into stopping his daily prayers. He brings a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but the district court grants qualified immunity. Uh oh! Is qualified immunity even a defense to a RFRA claim? You bet, says the Third Circuit—even though you’d be hard-pressed to find it in the statute. (On the plus side, they do hold—rightly—that the guards aren’t entitled to qualified immunity here.)
Louisiana prison officials routinely hold inmates past the expiration of their prison sentences. This plaintiff, in particular, was incarcerated for more than two years past the end of his sentence. Did he have a right to be released from prison after serving his sentence? Yes. Was it clearly established? Also yes. Can the prison officials be held liable? Fifth Circuit: Well, no—we’re going to make up a nonsensical new third step of qualified immunity, fault the plaintiff’s lawyer for not predicting it, and—hey presto—case dismissed. [Just complete calvinball over there. —ed.]
“It falls on the judiciary to ensure that the First Amendment is not reduced to a parchment promise.” —Judge Ho, author of the previous (rubbish) decision, also author of this (very good) dissent. He’s on the money here, but we wonder if he knows that the same goes for the Due Process Clause.
Houston cops execute a Black veteran in cold blood, leave him to die on the ground, magically “find” a gun in his car 22 days later, and promote the murderous officer to sergeant. The district court grants qualified immunity, but even an all-Republican panel of the Fifth Circuit is unable to stomach that outcome. Qualified immunity reversed.
The St. Louis Police Department makes up its own warrant system called “Wanteds.” Just like warrants, officers can arrest anyone with an outstanding Wanted, but unlike warrants, Wanteds bypass all judicial scrutiny. That’s a neat trick! The Eight Circuit rightly holds that it’s mostly unconstitutional, but wait, does that mean the plaintiffs can hold St. Louis liable? Eighth Circuit: Nope. “Wanteds” may be an official, department-wide system with whole employees dedicated to running it, but it’s not “so pervasive that it can be said to constitute custom or usage with the force of law.”
Legal observers from the National Lawyers’ Guild, wearing bright green hats emblazoned with the words “National Lawyers Guild Legal Observer,” get tear-gassed by police while recording a protest. A bystander yells at police to “get the fuck out of my park,” so police tear-gas him, too. First Amendment violations? Only tear-gassing the bystander, says the Eighth Circuit. Observing and recording police-citizen interactions is not a clearly established First Amendment right. Dissent: Guys, didn’t we already say that it was? Guys?
Is it clearly established that police can’t force to her knees and handcuff a “well-behaved, unarmed, 83-year-old woman who complies with police directions”? Ninth Circuit: Obviously yes. Judge R. Nelson, dissenting: How are police even supposed to do their jobs anymore.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that prisoners suffer a “physical injury” before they can file a lawsuit. Colorado prisoner: Guards punched me in my fractured, untreated jaw and stomped on my injured, untreated foot. Guards: Sounds like we didn’t cause those injuries! Tenth Circuit: But you caused them to become exacerbated, which counts. Case un-dismissed.
That’s it for this week. Please feel free to send this newsletter to any friends or family who might find it interesting. If you got this from a friend, you can sign up to receive future issues here.
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