Clearly Established #8

Welcome to the eighth issue of Clearly Established, a somewhat weekly, slightly irreverent roundup of recent accountability decisions. We took a couple of weeks off to work on an important brief in Index Newspapers v. City of Portland, but now we’re back with a bonanza edition: In addition to our usual qualified immunity fare, we’ve got a few new accountability doctrines to introduce you to. Let’s dive right in.

• Turkish security forces beat up anti-Erdoğan protesters in Washington, D.C. The protesters sue the Republic of Turkey. Turkey: We get immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. D.C. Circuit: Nope. Turkey: Political question doctrine? D.C. Circuit: Also no. Turkey: Uhh, international comity? D.C. Circuit: You can guess where this is going.

• Assertion: Federal prison guard put inmate in the hole for sixty days to retaliate against him for filing a grievance and a lawsuit. District court: Even under the strict confines of the Bivens doctrine (see here for a quick explainer), I can hear this inmate's First Amendment claim. Sixth Circuit: And since the decision below just denied summary judgment and wasn’t a final decision, we have no jurisdiction to hear the guard’s appeal. The Supreme Court may have said that qualified immunity is a weird exception to the final-decision rule, but Bivens ain’t.

• Here’s a case that illustrates why conservatives (should) also care about holding public officials accountable—why, as we explained in our recent amicus brief, “a cross-ideological consensus has begun to emerge that the qualified immunity doctrine is broken.” The University of Iowa requires student organizations to comply with its antidiscrimination policy. But in order to permit groups like the African Student Association, the Christian Legal Society, and the Feminist Majority Leadership Alliance to exist, it allows groups to base membership and leadership on certain traits, including race, sex, religion, and ideology. So can it deregister a Christian organization for requiring its leadership to abide by Evangelical Christian teachings on homosexuality? Eighth Circuit (March): No. Clearly established. No qualified immunity. Eighth Circuit (July): Did we stutter?

• Cop tells man to get on the ground. Man gets on his knees, hands in the air. Cop: “All the way to your stomach!” Man: “On my stomach?” Cop, frustrated by the evident failure to communicate, takes a running start, tackles the man, and slams his face into the pavement, breaking his jaw in several places. Cop, in court: I had to do it—he was being noncompliant! Eighth Circuit: Not even close. Even under the exceptionally deferential standards of qualified immunity, it was clearly established that you can’t use that kind of force on someone who’s not resisting, not a threat, and not a flight risk. This case goes to a jury.

• Here’s a judge-made doctrine that’s just as bananas as qualified immunity but doesn’t get nearly as much attention: the “Heck bar.” In essence, the doctrine is this: If a state court convicts you of a crime, and winning your federal civil-rights lawsuit would imply that the conviction was invalid, the federal court can’t hear your case. This next decision, out of the Ninth Circuit, is a perfect example.

  A 250 lb officer slams a 105 lb, 18-year-old girl into the ground, rubs her face in gravel, and arrests her. The DA initially wants nothing to do with the case, but once the girl sues the officer for excessive force, the DA charges her with resisting or obstructing a peace officer. She’s convicted by a jury. One element of resisting or obstructing is that the officer must have been “lawfully engaged in the performance of his duties”—which includes not using excessive force. So now, if the girl wins her excessive-force claim, that would mean the officer wasn’t lawfully performing his duties, and she shouldn’t have been convicted. Which, under the Heck bar, means the girl’s excessive-force case has to be dismissed. As the dissent notes, this decision is “likely to encourage the very sort of police overreaction to minor criminal behavior that has led to public outcry and calls for reform in recent years.”

• In a refreshingly straightforward opinion, the Tenth Circuit holds that a prison's 30-day ban on the use of tobacco in Native American services and indefinite ban on such services at all violated a Native American prisoner’s clearly established First Amendment rights.

• Most of the doctrines we focus on at Public Accountability are judge-made, but Congress has enacted its share of accountability-limiting laws. One of the worst is the Prison Litigation Reform Act, in which Congress did its very best to ensure that prisoners suffering at the hands of their jailers receive no relief from the federal courts. And this month, the Eleventh Circuit took the PLRA's already-harsh terms and made them a little more draconian, holding that in prison cases, preliminary injunctions—which are intended to maintain the status quo until a trial on the merits—can last no longer than 90 days. It’s practically unheard of to get a case to trial that quickly, which means that in most cases, prison guards can wait 90 days and then go right back to violating prisoners’ rights.

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